en
Back to the list

K3 Capital and Reental lose $3.9M in separate DeFi exploits

source-logo  bitcoinworld.co.in 17 m
image

Two decentralized finance platforms lost a combined $3.88 million on Nov. 18, 2026 after separate attacks on smart contracts running on Ethereum and Polygon, according to alerts from blockchain security firm Blockaid. The company flagged the K3 Capital sBOLD vault breach and the Reental stablecoin drain in a series of posts on X, describing both as ongoing at the time of disclosure, as Crypto.news reported.

Blockaid detected two DeFi exploits on Nov. 18, 2026. Attackers drained about $3.43 million from K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault on Ethereum and roughly $454,000 from Reental on Polygon, for combined losses near $3.88 million. The two attacks used different methods.

How the sBOLD vault was drained

According to Blockaid, the K3 Capital attack involved manipulation of a yield-generating vault linked to Liquity V2, a borrowing protocol that issues the $BOLD stablecoin against Ethereum collateral. Attackers took flash loans denominated in wrapped staked ether (wstETH), used them to manipulate the liquidation process, and bought sBOLD shares at prices well below their real value.

Know when your
coins move

Alerts, real-time prices, and market news — all in one app
qr-code Point your phone camera to install
4.8 based on 40K reviews in the App Store and Google Play

Blockaid summarized the sequence as minting cheap sBOLD shares, swapping the collateral and redeeming other depositors’ $BOLD. The firm published an Ethereum wallet tied to the attack, a helper address and an example transaction.

sBOLD is a third-party product run by K3 Capital, not by Liquity’s core team, according to Liquity’s documentation. Users deposit $BOLD in exchange for sBOLD shares, and the vault reinvests rewards from Liquity V2 stability pools. Crypto.news said it contacted K3 Capital for comment and had not received a response at publication time.

The audit history behind the vault

Prior reviews of the vault’s code examined a closely related risk. In its May 19, 2025 assessment, ChainSecurity found a high-severity accounting flaw in which an earlier version of the software could undervalue sBOLD shares after liquidations, potentially letting malicious participants pull out funds belonging to other depositors. The firm marked the issue corrected after changes were made to factor collateral into the vault’s valuation, writing that the possibility of value extraction through self-liquidations had been mitigated.

That audit recorded two critical, three high-severity and eight medium-severity findings, all listed as corrected. A separate May 2025 review by Dedaub examined the vault’s reliance on $BOLD market liquidity and its ability to price the stablecoin accurately.

It is not yet established whether the Nov. 18 attack exploited the previously identified accounting weakness or a different flaw.

Reental loses stablecoins after contract upgrade

The second incident targeted Reental, a real-estate tokenization platform on Polygon. Blockaid said an administrator upgraded the proxy contracts behind the platform’s USDT and USDC deposit tokens, known as aTokens, to a contract that allowed anyone to withdraw the underlying stablecoins. Remaining stablecoin balances were then swept out.

Roughly $454,000 had been drained across two transactions when the alert was published. Blockaid shared one address linked to the exploit and two affected contracts. Reental’s public documentation describes tokenized loans and property-linked shares in Spain and the United States.

Why it matters

Both breaches show how the same period of market weakness that pushes yield-hungry users into vaults and tokenized products also gives attackers more surface to probe. Vault designs that lean on third-party collateral accounting carry unique risk: a single pricing flaw can be turned against every depositor at once. Reental’s case is a different failure mode, one where an administrative upgrade — not clever market manipulation — put user funds at risk.

The two incidents land alongside renewed DeFi lending competition for idle bank deposits, which has pushed more capital into yield-bearing onchain products in recent months. For retail users, the practical lesson is that audits flag risks but do not remove them; users should check who actually operates a vault before depositing, not just which protocol it connects to.

What to watch

The key open questions are how much of the roughly $3.88 million can be traced or recovered and whether either protocol confirms the root cause of its breach. A clearer picture of the sBOLD flaw would also indicate whether similar vaults built on Liquity V2 need remediation. Meanwhile, the Curve Finance governance proposal to replace its vulnerable fee-conversion contract closes on Nov. 20.

bitcoinworld.co.in