Blockaid summarized the sequence as minting cheap sBOLD shares, swapping the collateral and redeeming other depositors’ $BOLD. The firm published an Ethereum wallet tied to the attack, a helper address and an example transaction.
sBOLD is a third-party product run by K3 Capital, not by Liquity’s core team, according to Liquity’s documentation. Users deposit $BOLD in exchange for sBOLD shares, and the vault reinvests rewards from Liquity V2 stability pools. Crypto.news said it contacted K3 Capital for comment and had not received a response at publication time.
The audit history behind the vault
Prior reviews of the vault’s code examined a closely related risk. In its May 19, 2025 assessment, ChainSecurity found a high-severity accounting flaw in which an earlier version of the software could undervalue sBOLD shares after liquidations, potentially letting malicious participants pull out funds belonging to other depositors. The firm marked the issue corrected after changes were made to factor collateral into the vault’s valuation, writing that the possibility of value extraction through self-liquidations had been mitigated.
That audit recorded two critical, three high-severity and eight medium-severity findings, all listed as corrected. A separate May 2025 review by Dedaub examined the vault’s reliance on $BOLD market liquidity and its ability to price the stablecoin accurately.
It is not yet established whether the Nov. 18 attack exploited the previously identified accounting weakness or a different flaw.
Reental loses stablecoins after contract upgrade
The second incident targeted Reental, a real-estate tokenization platform on Polygon. Blockaid said an administrator upgraded the proxy contracts behind the platform’s USDT and USDC deposit tokens, known as aTokens, to a contract that allowed anyone to withdraw the underlying stablecoins. Remaining stablecoin balances were then swept out.
Roughly $454,000 had been drained across two transactions when the alert was published. Blockaid shared one address linked to the exploit and two affected contracts. Reental’s public documentation describes tokenized loans and property-linked shares in Spain and the United States.
Why it matters
Both breaches show how the same period of market weakness that pushes yield-hungry users into vaults and tokenized products also gives attackers more surface to probe. Vault designs that lean on third-party collateral accounting carry unique risk: a single pricing flaw can be turned against every depositor at once. Reental’s case is a different failure mode, one where an administrative upgrade — not clever market manipulation — put user funds at risk.
The two incidents land alongside renewed DeFi lending competition for idle bank deposits, which has pushed more capital into yield-bearing onchain products in recent months. For retail users, the practical lesson is that audits flag risks but do not remove them; users should check who actually operates a vault before depositing, not just which protocol it connects to.
What to watch
The key open questions are how much of the roughly $3.88 million can be traced or recovered and whether either protocol confirms the root cause of its breach. A clearer picture of the sBOLD flaw would also indicate whether similar vaults built on Liquity V2 need remediation. Meanwhile, the Curve Finance governance proposal to replace its vulnerable fee-conversion contract closes on Nov. 20.