LlamaRisk Proposes Borrowing Speed Limits for Aave V3
thedefiant.io
11 November 2026 19:37, UTC
LlamaRisk proposed a borrowing speed limit for lending protocol Aave V3 on Nov. 11, aiming to slow large borrowing bursts and give its emergency guardian more time to respond to suspected attacks.
The risk adviser’s governance proposal, called LlamaGuard Caps, would keep a limited buffer of borrowing room above each reserve’s outstanding debt and replenish it after a delay. It is an ARFC, a discussion-stage proposal, not an approved or live change.
A reserve is a token pool within an Aave market. Aave’s existing borrow caps limit the total amount of a token that can be borrowed from a reserve. LlamaRisk’s proposal targets a different risk: spare capacity under a static cap can be consumed immediately, including by an attacker borrowing against compromised collateral. The limiter would constrain that pace without deciding whether each borrower is legitimate.
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The indicative settings are a buffer equal to 10% of a reserve’s debt, with a $1 million floor and $25 million ceiling. These are calibration assumptions, not final settings; LlamaRisk said values would be tailored to each market and reserve before deployment.
A Raise agent would restore the buffer after available room falls to 20% or less of the buffer and a 30-minute delay passes. Top-ups could occur no more frequently than that interval under the indicative settings. A borrower exceeding available room would need to wait, split the loan or use a dedicated large-borrower route.
A Cut agent would remove excess room reopened by repayments or liquidations. Under the indicative settings, headroom exceeding 110% of the buffer would trigger a cut within one or two blocks; smaller repayments would leave room available to borrow again.
From a Total Cap to a Borrowing Speed Limit
Cap increases would be computed through Chainlink’s Runtime Environment, a system for running workflows across an oracle network. Onchain checks would enforce the buffer, hard maximum and timing limits. Cuts would be computed directly from live Aave state. Governance and Risk Stewards would retain control of the hard maximum; automation would manage room below it.
A Separate Route for Large Borrowers
The trade-off is that legitimate large borrowers could also be delayed. LlamaRisk proposes a steward-executed batch for known large borrowers, including integrated institutional clients: the cap would rise by the exact loan amount, and the borrower would consume that room in the same transaction. That avoids leaving the extra capacity open to everyone.
A Risk Council Safe comprising Aave Labs and LlamaRisk would run large-borrower batches. The proposal does not spell out formal eligibility criteria for that route. Stewards could also temporarily hold a higher cap for onboarding or sustained demand, but that would leave the extra room available to any borrower during the hold.
Flash loans repaid in the same transaction and supply-cap settings would be unchanged at this stage. Aave’s core contracts would also remain unchanged, according to the proposal.
The Protocol Guardian would be able to disable either agent, while a freeze or pause would take precedence over cap increases. LlamaRisk cautioned that rate limits would slow liquidity outflows, not prevent or fully contain exploits.
LlamaRisk said the first-stage code had entered audits. The next step is community feedback, followed by a Snapshot vote if consensus emerges and then an onchain governance vote if Snapshot passes.