That transaction moved 520.2 $ETH, 3.25 million $USDC and 758,000 $USDT. One transaction, three assets, and the whole thing was done.
The withdrawal was authorized by a valid Schnorr signature derived from the vault’s aggregate key, also described as its TSS key.
TSS stands for threshold signature scheme, a setup where a group of parties holds pieces of a key, so no single member can sign on their own.
That is why the breach is suspected to stem from a compromise of the signing key, not from a bug in the smart contract code. The contract appears to have done what it was built to do. The issue is who was holding the pen.
Nine minutes to Tornado Cash
The attacker did not wait around. Most of the stolen stablecoins were swapped into $ETH shortly after the theft.
Roughly 2,909 $ETH then landed in Tornado Cash, a mixing service built to break the on-chain link between where funds came from and where they go. The gap between the theft and the laundering was approximately 9 minutes.
Converting stablecoins into $ETH also has a practical logic for an attacker. Issuers of tokens like $USDC and $USDT can freeze balances at specific addresses, while $ETH carries no such issuer-level switch. Moving fast closes off that avenue before anyone can act on it.
Chainflip hits the brakes
Chainflip responded by enacting what it calls a Full Safe Mode. All transactions were halted and operations were paused while the team investigates.
The market did not wait for the investigation to wrap up. Chainflip’s native token, FLIP, dropped by approximately 39% after the breach.
That slide pushed FLIP’s market capitalization down to around $24.85 million.
A second hit in a few months
This is not Chainflip’s first security problem this year. In September 2026, the protocol suffered an earlier exploit in which funds were drained amid orchestrated withdrawals from liquidity pools.
Two significant losses within a few months is a pattern that users and liquidity providers tend to notice.
What this means
For FLIP holders, the immediate story is the roughly 39% drop and a market cap now sitting around $24.85 million.
The bigger question is about trust. If the signing key compromise theory holds, Chainflip will need to explain not just what happened, but how its key management will change so it does not happen again.
A key compromise is a different kind of failure than a coding error. A smart contract bug can be patched and re-audited. A key compromise raises questions about the people, processes and infrastructure around signing, including the validators and operators who hold pieces of that key.
What to watch next: Chainflip’s post-incident findings on how the signing key was compromised, when and how the protocol exits Full Safe Mode, and whether any of the roughly 2,909 $ETH moved through Tornado Cash can be traced.