What Blockaid Reported About sBOLD
sBOLD automatically reinvests rewards from $BOLD stablecoins deposited into Liquity V2’s Stability Pools, according to Liquity’s documentation. Those pools use depositors’ $BOLD to repay undercollateralized loans in exchange for collateral. They also earn interest paid by borrowers.
The vault is built and maintained by K3, not Liquity’s core team. Users receive sBOLD shares representing their participation in the vault.
Blockaid said attackers used a flash loan of wrapped staked ether, or wstETH, and triggered liquidation of their own Liquity borrowing position. They then minted sBOLD shares cheaply, swapped collateral and redeemed $BOLD belonging to other depositors. In effect, the sequence let them buy into the vault at a depressed valuation before extracting its assets, according to Blockaid’s account.
A May 19, 2025, ChainSecurity audit had examined self-liquidation risks and said the possibility of extracting value that way “has been mitigated” in Version 3 of the code it reviewed. That historical finding does not establish whether the latest attack used the same flaw. K3’s initial statement did not explain the cause or announce reimbursement terms.
Blockaid Flags Reental Upgrade
Reental’s lending product allows borrowers to pledge real estate tokens as collateral and borrow stablecoins, according to the platform’s RNT Lend guide.
Blockaid described a different route into its deposit-token contracts: an administrator upgraded the $USDT and USDC proxies to code that allowed anyone to withdraw the underlying tokens, after which the remaining stablecoins were swept out. The alert did not establish who controlled the administrator or why the upgrade was made.
A PolygonScan transaction record corroborates part of that drain. At 6:41 a.m. ET on Nov. 18, a successful transaction moved about 294,040 USDT0 from one of the contracts Blockaid identified to another address. That transfer alone is not the full $454,000 estimate.
Blockaid described both incidents as ongoing when it issued its alerts. K3’s subsequent pause announcement establishes a response for sBOLD, but does not give depositors a reopening date or recovery commitment.