Somewhere on the Bitcoin network, automated programs are believed to lie in wait for wallet software to make a very old mistake that helps them siphon off funds. And when two Belgian researchers made that mistake on purpose, the bots showed up within seconds.
Vincent Jacquot and Benoît Donnet, computer scientists at the University of Liège, put $3 to $5 each into Bitcoin and Ethereum accounts that they had deliberately left vulnerable, then watched to see what would happen.
On Bitcoin, the attacks began “a second or a few seconds after the bait was set up,” Jacquot shared with CoinDesk this week. At least two rival transactions raced to claim the coins while they sat in the mempool, a kind of waiting room where transactions sit before the network confirms them.
The experiment highlights a broader vulnerability in Bitcoin’s open, permissionless design. Once a transaction enters the mempool, it is visible to everyone. That allows automated attackers to monitor the network around the clock, waiting for predictable mistakes rather than targeting individual victims.
It also shows why wallet security cannot rely on users alone. Developers, wallet providers, and exchanges need to build safeguards that prevent common errors from becoming instantly exploitable opportunities for bots.
A CoinDesk analysis of one of the traps shows how it played out.
The flaw involves the way Bitcoin wallets sign payments. Every signature relies on a random number, called a nonce, that is supposed to be used only once. If the same secret key ever signs two transactions with the same nonce, anyone who sees both can work out the key with a little algebra and take the money.
It is like using the same one-time password for two different bank transactions. Once someone sees both, they may be able to work out the underlying password and take control of the account.
The researchers sent 7,200 satoshis, the smallest unit of bitcoin, worth a few dollars, to each of six newly created addresses from one wallet. About an hour later, two of those addresses paid each other, both using the same nonce. That alone gave nothing away, because -two different keys had signed the transactions.
Then, one of the pair signed a third payment with that nonce – meaning a single key had reused its nonce – and the math to unlock it was there for anyone to do.
coindesk.com





